In 2024, Russians will elect Putin as president. Or czar, which is more appropriate. It is under the format of “tsar” that the outline of the election campaign in Russia is being created.
At first glance, Putin has nothing to fear – sociology research draws good figures of “popular support.” Moreover, the population associates its future with one person. Or the successor to whom this person will point. The same sociology shows the main fear of Russians – the absence of an “heir to the throne.” Ideal for Putin? Yes, but not quite. As it has happened in Russian history, a ruler who has made a weakness or suffered a military or military-political defeat easily loses power.
Accordingly, the Kremlin’s propaganda goals for the coming months have been reduced to a few main areas.
1. Strengthening the image of the “people’s tsar.” This was the focus of Putin’s big press conference a week earlier, and the same logic can be traced in the creation of Putin’s campaign headquarters. At the first event, the Russian president demonstrated “confidence” in the country’s successes and willingly talked about its achievements (naturally, under his leadership). At the same time, he showed readiness to respond to the needs of the plebs. A typical example is the personal questions of ordinary Russians, where there was either a reference to already prepared solutions that have not yet been implemented on the ground or a direct order to “sort it out.” The same logic can be traced in the formation of the election headquarters, where the “first places” are occupied by public people, but not from politics.
Read also: Russia decides to hold “presidential elections” in the occupied territories of Ukraine
2. The image of the “Tsar-soldier.” It is more complicated here – the Russian Armed Forces have not had large-scale successes for a very long time. Politically, Russia is losing its position even in the post-Soviet space. But, on the other hand, there were no large-scale failures either – the Russian Federation held the front line in Ukraine. Accordingly, the tsar demonstrated confidence in the future and readiness to fight until the “realization of the original goals of the special military operation.” But what is the image of a “commander” without “care about soldiers?” A significant part of the answers to the questions was devoted to this. Putin tried to cover topics related to the Armed Forces and mercenaries, both in terms of service and social guarantees. Finally, there was a call to the tank battalion commander, who participated in the battles for Maryinka.
3. The image of “the tsar – the collector of lands.” Holding the front in 2023 helped a lot. Russian propaganda, since May of this year, has been forming an “image of success” in the form of retaining the captured territories. Putin emphasized that the “new regions” already “feel like Russia.” The voter likes that.
Propagandists play up foreign policy issues very cautiously. The central thesis remains unchanged: “The war of the West against Russia by the hands of Ukraine.” Therefore, the theme of “Western threat” is actively highlighted, up to and including interference in elections. But the level of “foreign policy successes” is not emphasized too much – the war is still ongoing.
The concept of “tsar” is good in Russia because the population understands whom to obey. Possible negativity, ranging from personal issues to failures in domestic policy, fits into the old format of “the tsar is good – the boyars are bad.” Where you make a public flogging of the boyars (or just kill them), and the people get a portion of “justice.” The same system is being scaled up to the level of regions, where the governor is a “sovereign man,” a “mini-king,” and the local elites are “bad boyars.” This format, among other things, creates a safeguard against powerful separatist movements, because the culprits of “all the troubles” are presented as those who could act as an organizing force in the confrontation with the center – local business and political groups.
Read also: Loyalists say they will collect signatures to ‘nominate’ Putin for president
However, the concept of the tsar also carries a danger. If the tsar demonstrates weakness, especially if this weakness is confirmed, the tsar is demolished. A new one is chosen (appointed, in the case of palace coups).
The weakness of the tsar is also the electoral results. That is, the number of Russian citizens who have demonstrated their loyalty to the ruler with their votes. Therefore, it is extremely risky for the Kremlin to get less than 70% in the elections.
With this, we come to the topic of challenges.
1. War, veterans, radicals. The first and key danger to Putin was, paradoxically, in the pro-imperial, radical part of society. It was in this group that accusations of weakness, stupidity, surrender in the war, and so on, arose. The emergence of a strong opponent in this electoral field is dangerous. Therefore, Putin changed his rhetoric and, as described above, began to play the role of “commander-father of soldiers.” He also voiced his readiness to fight further. The only intrigue is if Strelkov also is allowed to run. But even if he is, he will take only a small number of votes and will only confirm the status of “tsar-military leader” for Putin.
2. The liberal wing of Russian society. Here, the concepts are different. At the initial stage of the campaign, the idea arose to dilute this field with a multitude of candidates. Last week gave three names at once: Duntsova, Nadezhdin, and Yavlinsky. The concept of reinsurance took over. Duntzova, who built her campaign through Telegram and social networks (where there was a chance of failure for the Kremlin), was not allowed. Yavlinsky(oh, surprise!) changed his mind. Nadezhdin was nominated by one of the “micro-parties.” From under the mothballs, they pulled out the “New People” project, which had not proved itself. Nechaev himself was not given the role of sparring partner. They combined the two parties (New People + Party of Growth) and nominated Duma Vice-Speaker Davankov. Formally, he is a man with a high position, but absolutely “gray” and controlled. And finally, to avoid additional problems, they denied Russian citizens abroad the right to vote. This is logical, since the Kremlin has somewhat less influence on that part of the “Russians abroad.”
Read also: General mobilization in Russia possible after 2024 elections — Danilov
3. Old parties, but on a smaller scale. Traditionally, Putin has been opposed by the Liberal Democratic Party and the Communists. The latter is the strongest opponent, capable of taking “protest votes.” This means that their symbol – Zyuganov – should not be nominated. The Communists understood the desire of their “bosses” and nominated Kharitonov.
The political field has been prepared. Of course, it will be thinned out. Putin needs a “victory” on the front by the time of the election, because the Russian Armed Forces have not demonstrated success “on their own” for a very long time. That’s why they are storming Ukrainian positions.
But, there may be a surprise. What if the RF gets a good slap in the face instead of victory? Not necessarily with an offensive on the front. Look at the Black Sea Fleet, the Crimean Bridge, or targets inside the Russian Federation. It won’t cancel the coronation of the new tsar, but it will shake his position a bit.
We’re bringing the voice of Ukraine to the world. Support us with a one-time donation, or become a Patron!
Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine