The Rising Threat of Kim Jong Un’s North Korea

A recent shift in rhetoric from North Korea and its supreme leader Kim Jong Un has brought fears of war in Korea to the forefront, with two prominent Korea watchers even claiming that Kim has “made a strategic decision to go to war.”

We should be concerned about the rising threat from North Korea, but not allow the North’s latest propaganda line to distract us from the real, growing dangers that North Korea poses. These dangers include: North Korea’s advancing weapons programs expanding its options and incentives for unprecedented, if limited, attacks on South Korea; its alignment with China and growing military relationship with Russia; and, its potential to widen a China-U.S. confrontation over Taiwan into a two-front war.

The new political line from North Korea that has some worried is more a recognition of reality than a signal of impending war. Since the armistice that halted the Korean War in 1953 left the Korean Peninsula divided, North Korea’s ideology had held out hope of Korean unification under its leadership, by political means or force. In recent weeks, however, North Korea shifted to declaring South Korea a permanent adversary and started dismantling the organizational and symbolic manifestations of its hopes for reunification.

This should be no surprise. Unification would be a disaster for Kim’s regime. Kim and his elite, with access to outside information can see what they are up against. South Korea has more than twice the population and more than 50 times the economic power of North Korea, along with a vibrant society steeped in choice and the free flow of information. Indeed, isolating North Korea’s people from the corrosive influence of South Korean lifestyles and culture is part of the regime’s survival strategy. Reconciliation with or military occupation of the South would involve too much interaction with hard to control South Koreans and would therefore be far more dangerous to the regime than clinging to power in the North.

So, if this shift in rhetoric does not actually signal war, and if North Korea attempting a takeover of South Korea is not in the cards, what should we be most concerned about? The risk of major, if limited, aggression by North Korea is growing. Pyongyang has long used limited military provocations for many purposes, such as demonstrating its strength and to undermine South Korean confidence in the ability of the U.S.-South Korea alliance to deter North Korea.

But the next round of such aggression could be much, much worse than ever before. North Korea’s military capabilities have improved and expanded in recent years, as has its backing from China and Russia, giving North Korea increasing options and incentives to escalate.

North Korea’s military capabilities have been rapidly advancing in various important categories for years. Its weapons development has been making particularly great strides. Just in recent months, North Korea has test-fired new submarine-launched and land-based cruise missiles, new ballistic missiles designed to evade missile defenses, and new Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the continental United States. Last year, the North displayed a new, smaller nuclear warhead design that can apparently fit on a much wider variety of its missiles, and also be carried by an underwater drone that it claims to have tested again this month.

Meanwhile, the growing alignment of China and Russia with North Korea amplifies the danger. Beijing and Moscow are shielding North Korea from the effects of UN sanctions and giving it political cover. North Korea’s recent shipments of ballistic missiles to Russia are a flagrant violation of UN sanctions resolutions that Russia and China both previously voted for. Russia firing these missiles into Ukraine allows North Korea to test their performance under operational conditions. As the White House has warned, Russian military capabilities could also flow to North Korea in return, such as “fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment or materials, and other advanced technologies.”

With all this in mind, the conditions are aligning for North Korea to conduct a localized attack with its improved capabilities while relying on threats of nuclear escalation and the potential for Chinese intervention to prevent regime-ending consequences.

North Korea has many options for such a limited attack, such as striking South Korean military units on sparsely populated islands near disputed Yellow Sea waters. This area has long been a venue for North Korean provocations, and just this month the North conducted artillery demonstrations nearby. These isolated islands are close to North Korea and right on China’s doorstep. North Korea might seize a temporary military advantage there, expecting Washington and Seoul to accept a settlement rather than strongly escalate in response—out of fear of triggering Chinese intervention or a North Korean nuclear response. Even a temporary North Korean military victory would be a political win for the regime and shake allies’ confidence in the United States. If a limited North Korean attack spiraled into a nuclear exchange or a larger war with China, this would admittedly be an even worse outcome.

These dangers are real and growing. North Korea is testing new missiles, expanding its nuclear arsenal, and trading weapons with Russia. The risk of North Korean escalation beyond the scale of anything we have seen since the armistice of 1953 is rising. Meanwhile, if China and the U.S. end up in a military confrontation—over Taiwan, for example—this is likely to lead to a two-front war with North Korea as well. North Korea is unlikely to sit on the sidelines as its Chinese patron and its sworn U.S. enemy face off to determine the fate of the region. North Korea has huge stakes in the outcome—perhaps a chance to see the U.S. ejected from the region—and what better time to attack U.S. bases than when China is already fighting the U.S.?

These are the dangers we should be focused on, rather than over-interpretation of Kim’s rhetoric as meaning he would independently launch a suicidal war.

Markus V. Garlauskas led the U.S. intelligence community’s strategic analysis of North Korea as the national intelligence officer for North Korea from 2014 to 2020, after 12 years of service in U.S. Forces Korea. He now is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.