The Road to Ceasefire Leads Through the Rafah Offensive

Have you wondered why, despite the devastation in Gaza and massive diplomatic efforts involving many countries, Hamas continues to refuse a ceasefire? It has a lot to do with its initial strategy on October 7—and the United States.

When Hamas attacked and invaded Israel, it did so knowing there would be a massive response by Israel and an operation into Gaza. It knew many Gazan civilians would die, indeed they counted on it, referring to their population as a “nation of martyrs” and taking pride in their sacrifices to further Hamas’s military goals.

The military strategy for Hamas’ October 7 attack was to create the largest scale of atrocity possible and survive Israel’s counterattack. Then, having survived, it intended to build up for many more October 7 attacks, all with the aim of achieving its grand strategic goal: the destruction of Israel and the death of the Jewish people.

Ghazi Hamad, a senior Hamas political leader, stated as much, saying, “Israel is a country that has no place on our land. We must remove that country … the Al-Aqsa Flood is just the first time, and there will be a second, third, and fourth. Will we pay a price? Yes, and we are ready to pay it.”

Hamas’s hope is that repeated attacks like October 7 will eventually break the will of the Israeli population. To do that, Hamas would need to survive the war.

Hamas’s defenses in Gaza were built to hold the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the eastern areas of Gaza. The defense also relied on the hundreds of miles of tunnels that Hamas had built under the civilian areas, protected sites, and infrastructure of Gaza. In the offensive in North Gaza, the IDF achieved operational surprise and performed well on the battlefield. As a result, Hamas’ defenses did not hold as well as they hoped, so Hamas embraced a temporary ceasefire and returned almost half the hostages. During that ceasefire, Hamas evacuated the remaining hostages and much of their leadership to hide among the concentration of civilians in the remaining uncleared areas of Gaza such as Rafah.

In the meantime, pressure at home and the suffering of Gazans led the United States to put pressure on Israel to change operations during the fighting in Khan Younis, in southern Gaza, by employing a much lighter force package. For the first time, Hamas could see a way forward.

If the United States could be made uncomfortable enough with the continuing of the war against Hamas, then it would put more pressure on Israel to wind down operations. Egypt, in part, was inadvertently aiding in Hamas’ strategy when they closed their border to Palestinian civilians. This trapped Gazans in the combat zone and guaranteed that, despite Israel’s and the international community’s efforts with humanitarian aid, there would be little relief to Gazans’ suffering.

While multiple countries joined Israel’s efforts to increase the amount of aid going into different parts of Gaza, to include airdrops and now a seaport, there will always be limitations while Hamas continues to hold the hostages and attack the IDF. Hamas actions to limit the aid to Palestinians continues to increase the likelihood that the United States will demand further restrictions on Israel–especially on operating in Rafah.

So why has Hamas refused a ceasefire now in Gaza?

Simple: They think their strategy is going to work.

They believe the United States will keep Israel out of Rafah, or that if Israel operates in Rafah, it will risk a strategic rupture with its only ally in the United Nations Security Council. Either way, Hamas potentially walks away with a strategic victory.

Without operations in Rafah, Israel will be forced to accept outlandish demands for the return of the hostages. Moreover, Hamas will survive and emerge as the only Palestinian organization to defeat Israel.

As it becomes increasingly clear that the United States has little stomach for an Israeli incursion into Rafah, Hamas has no reason to negotiate the terms of a ceasefire. It does not care about the interest of the Gazans. Hamas can maximize its gains with faith that the United States will ultimately impose a ceasefire on Israel. In the unlikely event that the Hamas assumptions about the United States start to prove false, they could attempt further delays of the Israeli offensive into southern Gaza by coming back to the table.

Without the realistic threat of an Israeli operation in Rafah, Hamas has no reason to seek a ceasefire, and given Hamas’ strategy, there can be no truly lasting ceasefire if Hamas can return to control Gaza.

As long as the United States seems opposed to an Israeli entry into Rafah, Hamas’ leadership can sleep relatively soundly in their tunnels and refuse to negotiate.

Ultimately, Hamas’ strategy and unwillingness to negotiate is entirely dependent on the United States acting as Hamas wants—an outcome that looks increasingly likely. This means that the key actor in determining whether Hamas will come to the table and whether a ceasefire is possible is not Israel but the United States.

In other words, while the road to a lasting ceasefire in Gaza may run through Rafah, its first stop is in Washington.

Dr. Jacob Stoil is the Chair of Applied History at the West Point Modern War Institute (MWI), Assistant Director of the Second World War Research Group (North America), Trustee of the U.S. Commission for Military History, and a founding member of the International Working Group on Subterranean Warfare.

John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project and host of the “Urban Warfare Project Podcast.” He served for 25 years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the bookConnected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connection in Modern War and co-author ofUnderstanding Urban Warfare.

The views expressed in this article are the writers’ own. They are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, Army University, or the U.S. Military Academy.